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The Cambridge companion to Ockham 3 This sad fact is partly due to the scarcity of translations but more fundamentally to the lack of reliable modern editions of primary texts and thus of good critical analyses and studies of them in the secondary literature.
The situation does not arise from any lack of raw materials but instead, it might be argued, from just the opposite. There are many early printed editions from the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries and an enormous number of surviving manuscripts of medieval philosophy and theology. But the early editions are often unreliable, whereas the manuscripts frequently present wildly different versions of the same work. They are written in a highly compressed and arcane system of abbreviation, a kind of shorthand that requires special training to read; early printed editions often retain the same system. Frequently the manuscripts are incompletely cataloged or not cataloged at all, and thus their contents are discovered only by chance.
In such circumstances, it is a complicated and painstaking business to produce a reliable, modern edition of a philosophical text, and without such editions there can of course be no useful translations or critical studies. It is no wonder, therefore, that even a major philosopher like Ockham remains largely unknown to modern readers.
Nevertheless, the situation has improved dramatically in recent decades. New and excellent editions of many works and authors have appeared. Ockham in particular has benefited, and we are now in a position to begin to appreciate and assess more confidently his true place in the history of philosophy. This development was made possible by the publication, between 1967 and 1988, of the first modern critical editions of all Ockham's philosophical and theological writings. The speedy completion of this enormous task by Gedeon Gál and his colleagues at the Franciscan Institute is one of the most impressive achievements of modern textual scholarship. 4 Ockham's political writings, which occupied him almost without pause from 1328 until his death in 1347, have likewise now all been critically edited with the exception of Dial., which is in progress.
5
With these editions, new and reliable translations have begun to appear. Although a much smaller portion of Ockham's work has been translated than, say, Aquinas's, a surprising amount is available in English, including several works in their entirety. 6 Likewise, there is now enough good secondary literature that curious readers can get a thorough grounding in all aspects of Ockham's thought. The most important secondary literature may be found by consulting the chapter notes and the Bibliography at the end of this volume, but the following sources in particular deserve special mention:
(1) For Ockham's philosophy and theology, with the exception of ethics and political theory, the indispensable starting point is Adams 1987a. There is no other work that studies a single medieval philosopher in such breadth and depth. Much briefer, but extremely clear and useful, is Chapter 3 of the introduction to Wood 1997. That chapter includes a discussion of Ockham's ethics as well. Indeed, it offers readers of the present volume an excellent orientation to Ockham's thought generally.
( Ockham's life was full of controversy. Although his philosophical and theological views were not in themselves especially radical, they generated considerable opposition even while he was still in his thirties. 7 In 1324 he was summoned to the papal court, then in Avignon, to answer charges of heresy. The pope then, John XXII, was engaged in controversy with the Franciscan order, to which Ockham belonged, over the notion of "apostolic poverty" -that is, over whether Jesus and the apostles owned property and had property rights, and therefore over whether the Franciscans' renunciation of all property could be regarded as an "imitation of Christ." On instructions from Michael of Cesena, the Franciscans' minister general, Ockham reviewed the situation and concluded that the pope was in heresy and so had ipso facto renounced his office. 8 In 1328 Ockham fled Avignon with the minister general and ended up in Munich, living out the rest of his life under the protection of Louis of Bavaria, the Holy Roman Emperor. It was during this time that Ockham composed most of his political writings, challenging the claims of John XXII and his successor, Benedict XII. Ockham died, excommunicated, in 1347. 9 So effective was he as a polemicist that at one point the pope threatened to burn down the city of Tournai if it failed to capture him and turn him over!
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After such a contentious life, it is little wonder that the Franciscans failed to champion his cause, as they did for their confrere John Duns Scotus, or as the Dominicans did for their own Thomas Aquinas. There was never an Ockhamist "school" of philosophy as there was a Thomist or a Scotist school.
11 Indeed, well into this century, Ockham's name continued to carry the faint odor of disreputability and scandal in certain quarters.
Not surprisingly, this reputation sometimes led to Ockham's being cast, depending on a particular writer's sympathies, either in the role of the great destroyer of the medieval worldview or in the role of a herald of the new, modern era. David Knowles has summarized the situation aptly as follows:
Neglected in his turn for centuries, save as a bogy to scare young Thomists, he was re-discovered as an historical figure by the students of medieval thought who, followers as they were of Thomas or Duns, regarded him as Apollyon, the grand deceiver and destroyer who ruined the fabric of the golden age of medieval thought. Others again, in more recent years, have seen in him one of the great creators, one of that group of contemporaries in whose writings Cartesian philosophy, anti-papal reform, modern science and the secular state can be seen in embryonic form.
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Fortunately, recent scholarship permits a more realistic assessment of Ockham's position in medieval thought. Although it is true that he contributed to, and was part of, the intellectual and social transformations taking place in fourteenth-century Europe, he did not originate them, cannot bear sole responsibility for them (whether credit or blame), and did not even approve of all of them. In fact, the true situation is far more complex, as the essays in this volume show.
Beginning in the 1970s, English-speaking philosophers of a broadly "analytic" training came to regard Ockham as a kindred spirit. This development was prompted by the realization that Ockham and certain other medieval thinkers were not only sophisticated logicians and philosophers of language but had also -like twentieth-century analytic philosophy -applied their logical techniques and skills to a wide variety of philosophical problems. 13 Medieval philosophy, or at least certain parts of it, had suddenly become "legitimate."
No doubt much of Ockham's thinking is genuinely similar to recent analytic philosophical work; it would be foolish to deny it.
14 But it is equally foolish to view Ockham, or any past philosopher, solely through a present-day lens. 15 That approach, by filtering out what is unfamiliar, guarantees in advance that we never really learn anything new from the history of philosophy. Ideally, what should happen is that readers will use what seems already familiar in Ockham as a pathway to probe more deeply into his thought and into medieval thought generally, thereby encountering and coming to appreciate problems, techniques, and perspectives that had perhaps never occurred to them previously or that they had never found reason to take seriously before.
ii. a conspectus of ockham's writings
Ockham's writings are conventionally divided into two groups: academic and political works. Except for items 33-4 listed in Section II.1.3, this corresponds to a chronological division into works written before Ockham fled Avignon in 1328 and those written afterwards. I here list all Ockham's works, with the best Latin editions and English translations. (The translations are not always based on the most recent editions.) Earlier translations of some items are listed in Beckmann 1992. For each item, the Latin title (and, where appropriate, the abbreviation used in this volume) is followed by a translation of that title. Works are listed in the order in which they are printed in the critical editions.
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II.1. Academic Writings
The academic writings are published in a modern critical Latin edition, Ockham 1967-88, in two series: Opera theologica (OTh, 10 vols., 1967-86) and Opera philosophica (OPh, 7 vols., 1974-88).
II.1.1. theological works
In libros Sententiarum = Sent. (Commentary on the Sentences).
Book I (Scriptum, completed shortly after July 1318). Books II-IV (Reportatio, 1317-18). Students progressing toward a degree in theology were required to lecture on the four books of Peter Lombard's Sentences, a standard textbook of the time. Ockham's lectures survive in two versions. For Book I we possess an ordinatio or scriptum -a text corrected, revised, and approved for dissemination by the author himself. For Books II-IV, we have only a reportatio. Unlike a scriptum, a reportatio is a transcript of actual lectures, taken down by a "reporter." Such reportationes are more reliable than modern-day students' "lecture notes" but have not had the benefit of the lecturer's careful revisions and corrections. 17 Ockham's Scriptum is divided into several "questions" on Lombard's Prologue and on each of the "distinctions" into which Book I of Lombard's Sentences is divided. The three books of the Reportatio dispense with "distinctions" (although Lombard has them) and are divided directly into "questions." The edition is distributed over OTh I-VII as follows: OTh I (I. Prol.-1.6); OTh II (I.2.1-3.10); OTh III (I.4. iii. the essays in this volume
The essays below touch on all main aspects of Ockham's life and thought. In Chapter 1, William J. Courtenay describes the major events and influences in Ockham's career as an academic and as a political polemicist. It should be emphasized that much of what Courtenay reports has only recently been uncovered, particularly the details of the fourteenth-century Franciscan educational system and the persons interacting with Ockham. Courtenay also discusses Ockham's influence into the fifteenth century, both in England and on the Continent.
In Chapter 2, Calvin Normore surveys the main outlines of Ockham's logic. He inventories the explicitly logical works, as well as the nonlogical writings in which the working out of logical issues is a prominent component. After describing the scope of what Ockham regards as logic, Normore turns to an account of Ockham's views: his semantics, including signification and supposition; the theory of truth conditions for simple and more complex propositions, including their tensed and modal variants; the theory of consequence; his reworking of the theory of topical "middles"; and his sophisticated treatment of categorical and modal syllogistic.
In Chapter 3, Claude Panaccio further describes Ockham's semantics and the role "mental language" plays in it. He explains Ockham's account of signification, connotation, supposition, truth conditions, and "exponible" propositions. He then describes how Ockham uses this machinery in arguing against universals and other entities his contemporaries favored and concludes that it serves a primarily metaphysical role for Ockham and should not be thought of as formulating an ideal "deep structure" of thought, as many scholars have supposed.
In Chapter 4, David Chalmers takes up the "standard" view that Ockham rejected synonymy in mental language. He notes that Ockham's texts are ambiguous and offers an array of theoretical arguments that Ockham ought to have allowed mental synonymy, even if he did not. It is striking to find Chalmers, in a paper drafted in 1991, pushing on largely philosophical grounds toward a view Panaccio and others have recently reinterpreted Ockham as actually having held, that there is mental synonymy after all and that synonymy is forbidden only between simple mental terms.
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In Chapter 5 I set out some main themes of Ockham's nominalist metaphysics, concentrating on his so-called "Razor" and his attempt to reduce ontological commitment by "paraphrasing" away certain entities. I argue that he remains committed to more than is usually thought. I claim too that his arguments against universals are not decisive, although they do weaken the case for realism.
In Chapter 6, Gyula Klima takes up Ockham's criticism of "old way" (via antiqua) semantics that he thinks leads to "multiplying entities according to the multiplication of terms." Ockham's alternative semantics avoids such a commitment and allows him to reduce the number of ontological categories. But Klima argues that Ockham's criticisms are misdirected. Via antiqua semantics is quite capable of avoiding the ontological commitment Ockham objects to. This suggests that what motivated Ockham was not so much ontological parsimony as it was his semantic project of simplifying the conceptual basis of all the theoretical sciences.
In Chapter 7, André Goddu surveys Ockham's natural philosophy. He shows that, although Ockham was an Aristotelian here, his Aristotelianism serves his own agenda. For instance, Ockham's views on matter and form are in some respects compatible with atomism. Again, he was uncomfortable with Aristotle's theory of final causality. Goddu goes on to outline Ockham's views on motion, infinity, place, void, time, eternity, continuity, and other physical notions.
In Chapter 8, Eleonore Stump examines some important features of Ockham's epistemology, using Aquinas's theory for comparison. She asks why Ockham felt compelled to reject the theory of sensible and intelligible "species" in cognition and suggests that the development of the notion of "intuitive" and "abstractive" cognition after Aquinas may have been in part a response to a lingering puzzle for the species theory. She explores Ockham's own account of intuitive and abstractive cognition in this context. Finally, she suggests that Ockham's epistemology may not have all the theoretical economy he claims for it.
In her discussion of Ockham's theory of intuitive and abstractive cognition, Stump puts what has become the "standard" reading of that theory into a historical context, providing what may be part of the motivation for the theory. It is all the more important, therefore, that in Chapter 9, Elizabeth Karger argues that the "standard" reading is a mistake based on a misunderstanding of key texts. She traces the origins of this reading through the modern secondary literature and argues that the texts in fact support a quite different understanding of Ockham's theory, according to which abstractive cognition is not by nature capable of causing false judgments, intuitive cognitions are not by nature incapable of causing false judgments, and there is no privileged connection between intuition and evidence.
The opposing views in Chapters 8 and 9 provide a perfect example of a current lively debate in Ockham scholarship. Readers are invited to study these chapters carefully and to form their own conclusions.
In Chapter 10, Peter King sets out the main features of Ockham's ethics. He shows how Ockham combines normative principles from Christian revelation with a conceptual apparatus derived from Aristotle. King also discusses Ockham's views on the moral neutrality of exterior acts, the claim that the only intrinsically virtuous act is loving God, Ockham's theory of five levels or stages of moral action, the role of "right reason" and divine commands, the sense in which humans are obliged to subordinate their will to God's, and Ockham's theory of the virtues.
In Chapter 11, Marilyn McCord Adams examines Ockham's controversial doctrine of "liberty of indifference": that even if it is aware of decisive reasons for an action, the will can choose to do it, not to do it -or even to do the opposite! This is the basis for the criticism that Ockham cuts morality off from nature, reducing ethics to obeying an arbitrary God whose choices can be as irrational as ours can. She defends Ockham against this charge, and along the way compares his views with those of his predecessors' -particularly Anselm's, Aquinas's and Scotus's.
In Chapter 12, A. S. McGrade combines the ethics in Ockham's academic writings with the politics in his later works. The question prompting his essay is how to reconcile the emphasis in the former on obeying God's will, who can command anything whatever, with the appeal to reason and natural law in the political writings. McGrade concludes that the shift of emphasis is not a change of mind and that the two are parts of one unified view.
In Chapter 13, John Kilcullen discusses the political issues and writings that occupied Ockham's last twenty years. He explains the facts and questions surrounding the controversy over "poverty" that was the kernel of Ockham's dispute with Pope John XXII. Kilcullen also surveys Ockham's views on property, legal and natural rights, heresy and heretics, the authority of the pope and the Holy Roman Emperor, the limits on that authority, and the role of women.
In Chapter 14, Alfred J. Freddoso takes up Ockham's views on faith and reason, contrasting them with those of his predecessors -particularly Aquinas. Freddoso argues that, although Ockham had a great admiration for natural reason, especially as represented by Aristotle, he did not -unlike Aquinas -regard Christian faith as fulfilling classical pagan metaphysics and ethics according to intellectual standards accepted by the pagan philosophers themselves. Accordingly, Freddoso concludes, Ockham was much more willing than Aquinas to allow irresoluble conflicts between faith and reason.
In Chapter 15, Rega Wood defends Ockham against the frequent charge that his theology of salvation is in effect a version of the ancient heresy known as Pelagianism, which denies the doctrine of original sin and holds that humans can reach salvation without any special divine grace. She argues that Ockham affirmed the necessity of grace for salvation, merit, and divine acceptance but not for virtue; unlike Saint Augustine, Ockham allowed for genuinely virtuous pagans. Wood further argues that, although Ockham maintained that an act of human free will is needed for merit and salvation, he is not thereby committed even to the more attenuated heresy of semi-pelagianism, which regards grace as necessary for salvation but questions the Augustinian doctrine of predestination by holding that the human will can take the initiative and thereby "control" God's grace. For Wood, Ockham's theology is orthodox here as well.
notes All references are given by author and date. Full particulars may be found in the Bibliography.
